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The greatest source of security problems facing the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) today is the prevalence of failed states1 that lack the administrative and 
governing capacity to secure the integrity of their territories and ensure the safety of 
their people. In states like Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan, mass 
state violence and repression against society and extreme conditions of political 
turmoil have served to escalate political violence to historically unprecedented levels, 
with massive humanitarian consequences. More than that, the violence bred in various 
failed states of MENA is no longer confined to the “national terrain”; it has spread to 
other regions and countries, as has been shown by the attacks on targets in New York, 
London, Madrid, Jakarta, New Delhi, Paris, and Brussels.  
 
This essay argues for an understanding of terrorism as a sociopolitical 
phenomenon that is closely correlated with regime/state violence. Moreover, terrorism 
is also being used by regimes to legitimize state violence and label any political 
opposition as unpardonable terrorist acts. Thus, this essay proposes that terrorism 
cannot be tackled primarily by security-based responses and military tactics. On the 
one hand, such responses to terrorism create a fertile environment for the spread of 
violent extremist groups. On the other hand, they allow brutally repressive 
authoritarian regimes to remain in power by capitalizing on their people’s abhorrence 
of instability and insecurity, and on Western fears of violent extremists to justify their 
use of brutal force. To that extent, security measures and military tactics alone will 
not address the roots of politically motivated violence, namely, the unbearably harsh 
political and socioeconomic conditions in the MENA region. On the contrary, by 
continuing to provide military, political, and financial support for ruthless regimes in 
MENA, international powers contribute to exacerbating the already grim 
socioeconomic and political conditions that foster terrorism in the first place. As long 
as international powers persist with their present approaches, they will themselves be 
perceived as threats and obstacles to the attainment of popular socioeconomic and 
political aspirations.  
Furthermore, support for authoritarian regimes inhibits the rise of legitimate 
political authority, thereby deepening the chaos that is exploited by terrorism. What 
is needed, and needed quickly, is a paradigm shift in counter-extremist approaches 
towards the formulation and implementation of long-term policies that prioritize 
human rights, civil liberties, economic improvement, and institutional reforms – 
exactly the kinds of popular demands raised by the ordinary local people of MENA 
during the so-called Arab Spring. Only with such shift in understanding the 
underlying causes of terrorism can diplomatic engagement help to steer intra-regional 
competition in MENA along peaceful channels, and away from sectarian paths that 
work to the advantage of authoritarian regimes, militants, as well as regional and 
international powers.  
 
 
                                                     
1 Lynch, Mark. November, 2016. “Failed States and Ungoverned Spaces,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 688:  24-35. 
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I. Authoritarianism and extremism   
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, authoritarian Arab rulers established radical nationalist 
regimes as a means of consolidating their power and controlling their people. The 
rulers built strong state apparatuses, installed powerful security services, prohibited 
political pluralism, controlled the media, and nationalized key economic sectors. Arab 
dictators capitalized on their radical nationalist, populist, and economic policies to 
mobilize the people and shore up their legitimacy.2 These policies, variously packaged 
in the name of “Arab Nationalism” or “Arab Socialism,” appeared to form a populist 
social contract by which the state and regime would take charge of development, meet 
the basic needs of citizens, secure political independence, and advance other national 
aspirations.3  Bolstered by oil revenues, remittances, loans, and different forms of 
economic and military assistance, Arab regimes achieved their goals to some extent. 
In the long run, however, most regimes failed to maintain the social contract that 
traded political acquiescence for socioeconomic welfare. In most of the Arab countries, 
both the public and private sectors stuttered and were stifled by nepotism, cronyism, 
corruption, and an apparent lack of the rule of law. 4  When faced with popular 
disaffection, the regimes opted for repression and mass killings when they should have 
chosen substantive political and economic reforms that might have facilitated the 
large-scale entry of youths into the labor market and the emergence of an inclusive 
and internally stable political system. According to the UN International Labor 
Organization (ILO), youth unemployment in the Arab region, which has a 
disproportionately large share of young people, is the highest in the world, exposing 
skewed economic policies, social justice deficit, and over twenty years of poorly 
managed economic liberalization.5 Thus, the Middle East population now has some of 
the world’s highest percentages of youth who are virtually shut out of the political and 
economic spheres and, therefore, harbor deep feelings of frustration and social 
exclusion.  
 
The oil and gas resources of the Middle East alone could have made MENA one 
of wealthiest regions of the world. Instead, despite being so abundantly rich in 
agriculture, extensive and long-term economic failures and rampant corruption have 
                                                     
2 Gasiorowski, Mark. 2014. “Introduction: Middle Eastern and North African States in 
Comparative Perspectives,” in Mark Gasiorowski (ed.,) The Government and Politics of the 
Middle East and North Africa, Seventh Edition, Westview Press, USA. 
3 Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 1995. “Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: An 
Overview,” in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble (ed.,) Political liberalization and 
Democratization in the Arab World, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 36.  
4 The World Bank, Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North 
Africa: Toward a New Social Contract (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003); The 
World Bank, Better Governance for Development in the Middle East and North Africa: 
Enhancing Inclusiveness and Accountability (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003).  
5  Al-Arabiya News, February 6, 2013 (https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/02/06/ 
264749.html); Driouchi, Ahmed. 2014. Knowledge-Based Economic Policy Development in 
the Arab World, USA: Business Science Reference.  
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turned it into a region that can barely feed itself.6 In the recent past, Egypt and Iraq 
were the potential breadbaskets of the region, but mismanagement, underinvestment, 
and counterproductive price distortions have ruined their agricultural sectors. In 
addition, the trade liberalization programs forced by the IMF and World Bank have 
undermined or discouraged state and private investment in the agricultural sectors.7 
After being almost self-sufficient in wheat in the 1960s,8 for example, Egypt, one of the 
largest food importers in the world, is now a net importer of more than half of its total 
intake of wheat.9 The Arab world stands at the top of the world rankings in terms of 
food and nutrition insecurity principally because of the region’s high dependence on 
food imports for consumption, water scarcity, its vulnerability to climate change, and 
prevalence of poverty and social instability.  
 
There is, in short, a severe organic crisis in MENA that inflicts great insecurity 
on practically all spheres of life. Not since the end of colonial rule has the region sunk 
to such low levels of human, institutional, and socioeconomic developments and such 
endemic extents of corruption. 10  By preventing citizens from being meaningfully 
involved in the governing process, the political system undermines their sense of 
belonging. Most people in the MENA do not view their state institutions as being 
neutral or legitimate because their regimes not only tightly control the legislature, the 
judiciary, and the mass media but also manipulate elections and mismanage public 
funds. In other words, the system is bankrupt – it is dismantled by dictators who 
replaced governmental legitimacy with cults of personality. As it became mired in 
crises, the region lacked basic institutional frameworks that could mediate between 
the rulers and the ruled. One outcome of this institutional void, so to speak, was the 
emergence of non-state actors and groups who proffer wholly different visions and 
ideas of political, economic, security, and humanitarian projects. 
 
 
II. Subversions and blowbacks before and after the “Arab Spring” 
 
Between 2010 and 2011, millions of people took to the streets to demand change 
and an end to authoritarian rule. Their demands were expressed in universal terms: 
justice, freedom, and dignity. No group among the dissidents called for an “Islamic 
State.” All wanted to seize the state back from the typical Arab “President for Life.” 
However, the Arab “spring” has yielded to a long dark winter as the movements for 
                                                     
6 Kamrava, Mehran & Babar, Zahra. 2012. “Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the 
Middle East,” CIRS Summary Report (6): Center for International and Regional Studies, 
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. 
7  Pace, Michelle & Cavatorta, Francesco. 2012. “The Arab Uprisings in Theoretical 
Perspective – An Introduction” Mediterranean Politics, 17 (2): 125-138.  
8 Hanieh, Adam. 2013. Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle 
East, Haymarket Books, Chicago, IL.  
9 Egypt: Wheat Sector Review. 2015. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, FAO Investment Center: (http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4898e.pdf). 
10  “Arab Human Development Report 2016,” United Nations Development Program: 
(http://www.arab-hdr.org). 
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reform were suppressed by the old regimes, subverted by counter-revolutionary 
regional powers, and even undermined by regional and international actors such as 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, the US, the EU, and Russia. What began, and should have been 
widely supported, as a regional advance towards democratization, was aborted. In its 
wake came a sickening deterioration in humanitarian, security, and economic 
conditions that framed the context for a surge in state violence, violent extremism, and 
non-state militancy.  
 
What role did the US play in the unfolding descent into chaos? The US has long 
supported authoritarian regimes in MENA to retain its influence over the region and 
its resources. The strategy of the US linked “stability” with “security” – the police and 
military-enforced stability of its client security states in MENA. The close 
relationships between the authoritarian regimes in MENA and the Western powers 
hampered popular moves for democratization. The 2011 uprising in Egypt and its 
aftermath provided a clear example. Egypt had its first democratically elected 
government in 2012. Its first civilian president served for only a year before the 
military deposed him in a coup, using popular mobilization against the civilian 
government as the pretext for bloodily restoring a military dictatorship. Not only did 
the “pro-democracy” Western powers not intervene against the Egyptian military, but 
the same powers, led by the Obama administration, declined even to call the coup a 
coup so as to preempt any curtailment of military assistance to the Sisi regime11 that 
went on to rule with much more brutal repression and extensive human rights 
violation. International support is crucial for the security establishment of most 
authoritarian regimes and their capacity to hold on to power. One can only recall the 
example of Eastern Europe where the withdrawal of the Soviet Union’s support ended 
the coercive backbone of Eastern European regimes. Also in Latin America, the United 
States’ shift away from supporting authoritarianism after the Cold War dealt many 
regimes an existential blow.12  
 
All this, one might say, formed the background to the story of Ahmad Darrawi, a 
young and idealistic Egyptian who helped to lead the Tahrir Square protests in 2011, 
and ran for Parliament in 2012 under the slogan, “Dignity and Security,” only to die 
three years later as an Islamic State fighter in Iraq.13 Darrawi’s story is tragic in more 
ways than one, but it is illustrative that he and many other “militants” and “extremists” 
of his generation were the social products of authoritarian rule abetted by cynical 
external intervention. Hundreds of thousands of youths in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and 
elsewhere are graduates from the prisons and torture chambers of their autocrats. For 
                                                     
11 Pressman, Jeremy. 2016. “US Policy after the Uprisings: Alliances, Democracy, and 
Force,” in Mark L. Haas and David Lesch (eds), The Arab Spring: The Hope and Reality of 
the Uprisings, Westview Press, page 277.  
12 Bellin, Eva. 2004. “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism 
in Comparative Perspective,” Comparatives Politics, 36 (2): 139-157, page 144.  
13 Worth, Robert. F. April 7, 2016. “The Democracy Activist Who Became A Suicide Bomber,” 
The Wall Street Journal, (http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-democracy-activist-who-became-
a-suicide-bomber-1460048520).  
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them, Sisi’s coup and his regime’s bloody suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other opposition forces in Egypt proved the futility of peaceful struggles for change 
through standard political mechanisms.  
 
By now, it would be apparent to most that US interference and intervention on 
behalf of anti-democratic regimes have engendered popular hatred that may well 
undermine the long-term security interests of the US. One has just to recall the well-
known CIA intervention in overthrowing the democratically elected Iranian Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in 195314 that killed any chances for Iran developing 
into a democratic society, and planted the seeds for anti-American sentiments across 
the Middle East. Later, the Iranian people overthrew the Shah and installed the 
Islamic Republic in 1979. In more recent times, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and 
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his brutal regime did not lead to a “better world,” 
but eventually paved the way for the “Islamic State.”  
 
In short, external intervention – military and otherwise – has not ceased after 
the Cold War but has even extended to Kuwait, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, and the 
memories of their repercussions have not been erased among the people of MENA. To 
take another instance, the present Sunni-Shi’a conflicts largely emerged out of a 
destabilized Iraq. There, between 2003 and 2006, the occupation force of the US 
imposed a dysfunctional sectarian distribution of power that precipitated a civil war 
between Sunni and Shi’a Iraqis, which in turn aggravated the “Sunni-Shi’a” regional 
rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Tens of thousands of young Muslims flooded 
to Iraq to fight the US occupation of Iraq, just as their predecessors had fought the 
USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan. If the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan spawned a 
transnational professional jihadist organization such as al-Qaeda, the post-2001 anti-
US insurgency of the Taliban and the invasion of Iraq paved the way for al-Qaeda spin-
off militants to pursue their dream of building and governing their own “Islamic State.”  
 
There is a useful lesson to be learned even from this turmoil. In Iraq from 2006 
to 2007, the Americans took measures to incorporate the Sunni into the newly invented 
but Shi’a-dominated political system. The inclusion of the Sunni had one notable 
outcome: it encouraged a Sunni revolt against Al-Qaeda – now the “Islamic State” – in 
Iraq. By 2011, Al-Qaeda was on the verge of collapse, having lost its base in the Sunni 
lands in Iraq. Subsequently, though, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, fearing Sunni 
influence after Al-Qaeda’s defeat, alienated the Sunni in Iraq with his authoritarian 
and sectarian policies. With the advent of the Arab Spring, Maliki opportunistically 
declared Sunni protestors against his policies as “terrorists” and brutally repressed 
them.15 Maliki’s policies marginalized the Sunnis, left them with no incentive to stay 
within the system, and pushed more militants into the arms of ISIS. 
                                                     
14 Bryne, Malcolm. August 19, 2013. “CIA Admits it was Behind Iran’s Coup,” Foreign 
Policy: (http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/19/cia-admits-it-was-behind-irans-coup/).  
15 Al-Marashi, Ibrahim. 2017. “Iraq and the Arab Spring: From Protests to the Rise of ISIS,” 
in Mark L. Haas, David Lesch (eds), The Arab Spring: The Hope and Reality of the 
Uprisings, Westview Press, page 154. 
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III. Is there a way out? 
 
Today, ISIS may be the most fearsome organization in MENA. Still, it did not 
create the region’s wars. Instead, ISIS is itself the product of dehumanizing conditions: 
economic collapse, tyranny and repression, nepotism and corruption, and the cynicism 
of Western foreign policies that rhetorically promote democracy but shy away from 
supporting democratic principles in practice. 16  Conflicts, especially in Syria, and 
Western military invasions destroyed legitimate authority, and created a power 
vacuum which ISIS exploited while offering a vision of an “Islamic State” that promises 
to replace the status quo. To that degree, ISIS is a revolt against an international 
system that has abetted a most wretched treatment of the societies of MENA. Critical 
examination of the conditions that bred terrorism must precede the formulation of 
long-term policies and strategies that can defeat it while bringing improvement to the 
region. The goal of efforts to resolve the current impasse in MENA could be a concerted 
international effort to rebuild the region’s shattered states. This should not be taken 
as a license to conduct an open-ended “war on terror.” On the contrary, this calls for 
social and political struggle, not heightened military adventure. Calls for tougher, 
wider, or deeper military responses overlook the unspeakable suffering of the local 
population resulting from internal repression and external assaults. Only brutal 
authoritarian regimes and violent extremist groups such as ISIS truly benefit from 
ceaseless violence in the forms of direct invasions, stealthy bombardments, and “proxy 
wars.” If ISIS has had a wide appeal, it is less because of its uncompromising religiosity. 
Rather, it covers its violent actions with the “legitimacy” that comes from (successfully) 
fighting ruthless regimes and foreign invaders. In the long term, efforts to root out 
groups like ISIS must be accompanied by earnest measures to replace repressive 
authoritarian regimes. For both to succeed, the time-tested prerequisites for political 
stability and the absence of chaos must be met: economic growth, equitable 
distribution, inclusive modes of representation, good governance, and clean 
government – in a word, “freedom, justice, and development,” the common call of the 
Arab Spring. 
                                                     
16 Abdel Samei, Marwa Fikri. April 5, 2015. “US Arms Hypocrisy in Egypt, Obama’s New 
Beginnings that Never Started,” Informed Comment  (http://www.juancole.com/2015/04/ 
hypocrisy-beginning-started.html). 
